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A number of studies have observed that the motor system is activated when processing
the semantics of manipulable objects. Such phenomena have been taken as evidence that
simulation over motor representations is a necessary and intermediary step in the process
of conceptual understanding. Cognitive neuropsychological evaluations of patients with
impairments for action knowledge permit a direct test of the necessity of motor simu-
lation in conceptual processing. Here, we report the performance of a 47-year-old male
individual (Case AA) and six age-matched control participants on a number of tests probing
action and object knowledge. Case AA had a large left-hemisphere frontal-parietal lesion
and hemiplegia affecting his right arm and leg. Case AA presented with impairments for
object-associated action production, and his conceptual knowledge of actions was severely
impaired. In contrast, his knowledge of objects such as tools and other manipulable objects
was largely preserved. The dissociation between action and object knowledge is difficult
to reconcile with strong forms of the embodied cognition hypothesis. We suggest that
these, and other similar findings, point to the need to develop tractable hypotheses about
the dynamics of information exchange among sensory, motor and conceptual processes.
Keywords: embodied cognition, cognitive neuropsychology, concepts, action recognition, action production, tools
INTRODUCTION
On a daily basis we do remarkable things: we drive our automo-
biles to work, we send messages to our friends with the push of a
few buttons, and use tools that extend the capabilities of our bod-
ies. An indefinite set of object concepts are spontaneously called
upon in the service of our day-to-day interactions with the envi-
ronment. How are object concepts organized and represented in
such a way to make everyday behavior possible? How do sensory
and motor representations contribute to the organization and rep-
resentation of object concepts? A prominent theory that proposes
an answer to these questions is the embodied cognition hypothe-
sis. That hypothesis argues that conceptual knowledge consists, in
whole or in part, in the simulation, or re-enactment of the same
sensorimotor processes that are engaged during actual interac-
tions with the relevant types of stimuli. The first clear articulation
of this proposal was by Allport (1985):
“The essential idea is that the same neural elements that
are involved in coding the sensory attributes of a (possibly
unknown) object presented to the eye or hand or ear also
make up the elements of the auto-associated activity-patterns
that represent familiar object concepts in ‘semantic memory.’
This model is, of course, in radical opposition to the view,
apparently held by many psychologists, that ‘semantic mem-
ory’ is represented in some abstract, modality-independent,
‘conceptual’ domain remote from the mechanisms of percep-
tion and of motor organization.” (p. 53).
On that hypothesis, when one is asked to name a hammer, a neces-
sary, and intermediary step in the naming process involves retrieval
of motor-relevant information associated with the use of hammers
(e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Barsalou
et al., 2003; Simmons and Barsalou, 2003; Zwaan, 2004; Gallese
and Lakoff, 2005; Pulvermüller, 2005; Kiefer and Pulvermüller,
2012). The embodied cognition hypothesis thus predicts that if an
individual were to incur brain injury that impaired his/her abil-
ity to use tools, then the person would also have a conceptual
impairment for tools. In Allport’s (1985) words: “. . . the loss of
particular attribute information in semantic memory should be
accompanied by a corresponding perceptual (agnostic) deficit.”
(1985, p. 55; emphasis in original). In other words, according to
the embodied cognition hypothesis of tool recognition, loss of
motor knowledge about how to use tools should be associated
(necessarily) with a corresponding semantic deficit. This predic-
tion can be tested with cognitive neuropsychological evaluations
of individuals with acquired brain damage. The goal of the cur-
rent investigation was to test the embodied cognition hypothesis of
tool recognition with a detailed case study of a 47-year-old indi-
vidual who sustained a left cerebrovascular accident (CVA) and
presented with a circumscribed impairment for knowledge of the
typical actions associated with objects.
EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The embodied cognition hypothesis of concept representation is
an example of a broader theoretical framework based on the idea
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that comprehension involves covert production. Perhaps the best
known example of this class of theories is the motor theory of
speech perception (e.g., Liberman et al., 1967; Liberman and Mat-
tingly, 1985; for a recent review, see Galantucci et al., 2006). That
theory made the important contribution of emphasizing the idea
that recognition should not be conceived of as a passive process
of, for instance, matching a percept to a template stored in mem-
ory. Motor theories of perception have recently gained widespread
popularity in the context of the putative mirror properties of
some neurons in premotor and parietal regions of the macaque. In
macaques, it has been shown that neurons in premotor and parietal
cortex are activated when performing gestures and when observ-
ing others perform gestures (i.e., mirror neurons). This finding
has been argued to provide support for the hypothesis that motor
processes involved in action production are constitutively (i.e.,
necessarily) involved in action recognition (di Pellegrino et al.,
1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; for review see
Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzo-
latti and Sinigaglia, 2010) for critical reviews and discussion see
Mahon and Caramazza, 2005; Dinstein et al., 2008; Hickok, 2009,
2010; Stasenko et al., in press).
However, whereas motor theories of action recognition are pro-
posals about how perceptual information is comprehended and
interpreted, the embodied hypothesis of concept representation
is a claim about the representation of object concepts. A range
of findings has been argued to support the embodied cognition
hypothesis of concept representation. For instance, it has been
shown that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of somato-
topic specific portions of motor cortex selectively affects process-
ing of information relevant to the corresponding effector (words
describing hand actions, or foot actions; Pulvermüller et al., 2005;
for review see Pulvermüller, 2005). Another TMS-based finding
is that there is modulation of motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in
distal limb muscles associated with corresponding effector-specific
action words. For instance, MEPs in hand muscles are modulated
by processing of hand-related action words compared to foot-
related action words (Buccino et al., 2005; Papeo et al., 2009).
In sum, data from TMS have shown that there is an association
between the activation of the motor system and comprehension
of action words, in a somatotopic manner. That basic phenome-
non has also been observed using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI; Buccino et al., 2001; Hauk et al., 2004; Tettamanti
et al., 2005).
Another class of findings demonstrates automatic activation
of object use information when viewing manipulable objects. A
widely replicated finding is differential BOLD contrast in pari-
etal and premotor structures when naming or viewing tools (e.g.,
Chao and Martin, 2000; Noppeney et al., 2006; Mahon et al.,
2007). These data have been taken as evidence for the automatic
retrieval of motor-relevant information associated with the pro-
cessing of tools. Finally, a number of behavioral findings have
also been argued to support the claim that the motor system is
involved in language comprehension. The most common find-
ing is that response times (RTs) are facilitated when processing
the semantics of sentences whose meaning implies an action
in the same direction as a manual response (toward the body;
away from the body; e.g., the “Action-sentence Compatibility
Effect,” or ACE, of Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al.,
2008).
THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION
If conceptual understanding of tools and their names neces-
sarily involves simulation of motor-relevant content, it follows
that impairments affecting knowledge of object-associated actions
should be associated with conceptual impairments for tools. To
foreshadow the results, Case AA presented with an action produc-
tion impairment (i.e., apraxia of object use), as well as an impair-
ment for conceptual knowledge of actions. However, his ability
to extract semantic information from object stimuli remained
relatively intact. The results are discussed in the context of the
embodied cognition hypothesis and alternative explanations of
the empirical phenomena that have been argued to support that
theory.
CASE REPORT
Case AA was a right-handed man born in 1963 with 13 years
of education who suffered an ischemic stroke in February 2010.
Diffusion-weighted images taken at the time of clinical care in Feb-
ruary 2010 revealed a large left-sided infarction (see Figure 1A);
the occlusion originated in the distal M1 branch of the left middle
cerebral artery (MCA), sparing the anterior and posterior cerebral
arteries (see Figure 1B). Case AA’s ischemic stroke lesioned a large
portion of frontal and parietal cortex, pre/post-central gyrus, and
posterior lateral temporal cortex. We first saw this individual in
February 2011 when he was referred from the Unity Rehabilita-
tion and Neurology Center in Greece, NY, USA; he had hemiplegia
that affected the mobility of his right arm and leg. His speech and
executive functioning were affected by the stroke as well. All testing
sessions took place between February 2011 and June 2011. Case AA
gave informed written consent in accordance with the University
of Rochester Institutional Review Board.
CONTROL PARTICIPANTS
Six participants (males) served as controls for Case AA’s per-
formance. All control participants gave written informed con-
sent in accordance with the University of Rochester Insti-
tutional Review Board. Control participants had no his-
tory of neurological illness, and were matched to Case AA
for age (mean= 49.3 years; range 42–55 years), education level
(mean= 14.9 years; range= 12–18 years), and handedness (Edin-
burgh Handedness Questionnaire, Oldfield, 1971; mean= 0.92;
range= 0.53–1; Case AA’s reported pre-morbid handedness coef-
ficient= 1). Control participants completed the battery of tests
in two sessions that lasted approximately 2 h each. Unless other-
wise noted, control performance refers to this group of matched
controls.
GENERAL METHODS
Across all tasks, unless otherwise noted, Case AA was asked to
quickly and accurately complete every trial. Each trial lasted 10 s
or until a response was given, whichever came first. If Case AA
was not able to respond in 10 s the trial was considered incor-
rect and scored as zero. All picture stimuli were grayscale and
400 by 400 pixels (all in-house test stimuli can be found in the
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Diffusion-weighted images of Case AA’s left-hemisphere lesion. (B) Angiography and origin of Case AA’s left-hemisphere lesion.
Supplementary Material). For experiments requiring overt verbal
responses, responses were spoken into a microphone and stim-
ulus presentation, and response recordings were controlled with
DMDX (Forster and Forster, 2003). The responses were analyzed
offline as wav files. All experiments that required keyboard presses
were controlled with EPrime Software 2.0 (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA). (Monitor information: View Sonic,
1620× 1050 pixels, 120 Hz).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Modified t -tests were computed to assess if the performance of
Case AA was different from the performance of the control par-
ticipants using software provided by Crawford et al. (1998) and
Crawford et al. (2010)1.The software takes as input healthy con-
trol participants’ mean, standard deviation, number of control
participants, and the patient’s score, and computes a t -test, a point
interval (percentage of the population that would have a lower
score), 95% confidence intervals associated with the point interval,
1The modified t -test is computed by taking the difference between the patient’s
score and the mean of the control sample, and dividing it by the product of the
control sample’s standard deviation (SD) and the square root of the sample size
(N ), plus one, divided by the sample size. Thus, as the control sample size increases,
the denominator decreases in size, and the t -score increases.
an effect size (z-score) associated with the patient’s performance,
and 95% confidence intervals on the effect size2.
The Revised Standardized Difference Test (RSDT) was used to
calculate a dissociation between Case AA’s performance on two
tests. The RSDT takes as input the patient’s performance on two
tests, as well as control participants’ mean, standard deviation, and
the correlation between control participants’ scores on the two
tests. The program computes the same measurements as above,
and tests whether the patient’s accuracy difference between two
tests meets the criterion for a dissociation (strong or classical;
for precedent, see Shallice, 1988); dissociations may be “classical”
(Case AA is impaired on Task 1 but not on Task 2) or “strong”
(Case AA is impaired on Task 1 and Task 2, but Task 1 is impaired
to a greater degree than Task 2).
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY I: VISUAL OBJECT RECOGNITION, LINGUISTIC
PROCESSING, AND VISUAL LONG-TERMMEMORY ENCODING
Case AA was administered a battery of tests probing mid- and
high-level visual processing, number identification, word reading,
2In the text we report t - and p-scores associated with Case AA’s performance; see
the Supplemental Online Materials for point and interval estimates, and effect size
and effect size estimates for all tests that Case AA completed.
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short-term memory retrieval, and visual long-term memory
encoding and retrieval. Here we give a brief overview of his (gener-
ally intact) performance (for details, see the Methods and Results
in the Supplementary Materials).
Visual object recognition
Case AA’s motion and color perception, object decision, and letter
identification were within control range or at ceiling (see Table S1A
in Supplementary Material). Case AA was flawless when naming
one- and two-digit numbers. He was impaired relative to controls
when naming three-digit numbers (p< 0.05), making two errors
mixing the order of the digits, Case AA had a mild impairment
when asked to match two of three overlapping figures (p< 0.05).
Case AA’s performance on the Birmingham Object Recognition
Battery (BORB; Riddoch and Humphreys, 1993) was within the
range of controls on all the subtests he completed (See Table S1A
in Supplementary Material for all results).
Linguistic processing: the psycholinguistic assessment of language
processing in Aphasia
Case AA was similar to controls across a number of The Psycholin-
guistic Assessment of Language Processing in Aphasia (PALPA;
Kay et al., 1992) word reading tests that manipulated various psy-
cholinguistic properties of words (e.g., imageability, frequency,
grammatical class, spelling irregularity, etc., see Table S2A in Sup-
plementary Material). The only difficulty Case AA had was with
reading non-words with four letters (3/6, 50%; p< 0.05), and
reading low imageability and low frequency words (18/20, 90%;
p< 0.01). Independent of those factors, his ability to read words
from different grammatical classes (nouns, verbs, adjectives) was
comparable to controls (see Table S2A in Supplementary Material
for all results).
Sentence repetition
Case AA successfully repeated 34 out of 36 sentences auditorily pre-
sented by the experimenter (FG). Of the two errors that Case AA
committed, both involved rearranging one word in an auditorily
presented sentence, and pluralizing one word,
Experimenter: “The horse’s got less chickens to scare.”
Case AA: “The horse’s got more chickens to scare.”
Experimenter: “The man’s moving the horse.”
Case AA: “The man’s moving with horses.”
Cookie theft
Case AA’s spontaneous language production was evaluated several
times with the Cookie Theft test, a subtest of the Boston Diagnos-
tic Aphasia Examination (BDAE; Goodglass and Kaplan, 1972).
Case AA was given 2 min to provide as detailed a description as
possible. Generally, across all testing sessions Case AA’s speech was
fluent but clearly impoverished. He did not make phonological or
morphological errors when explaining the contents of the scene.
2.14.2011. They’re standing on a cookie jar and uh, he’s
falling. She’s washing dishes, the sink is overflowing with
water.
2.23.2011. She’s reaching for the cookie jar, up on the stool,
the stool’s about to fall over. She’s washing dishes, but the
dishes are overflowing, going onto the floor. She’s laughing.
Visual long-term memory encoding and retrieval
Case AA’s ability to encode long-term semantic information from
visually presented stimuli was also within control range; when
asked to identify repeated images embedded within a series of
216 images, Case AA was at ceiling (task and stimuli modified
from Brady et al., 2008). All results can be found in Table S3 in
Supplementary Material.
DISCUSSION
Case AA performed within control range or had only mild impair-
ments on a number of tasks investigating visual perception, visual
object recognition, long-term visual memory, word and number
reading, and spontaneous speech. His ability to follow directions
and perform various tasks was not affected by his brain injury.
Having ruled out general impairments Case AA may have had
with object recognition, language, and memory, and ensuring his
ability to follow directions over different forms of input and out-
put was intact, we set out to characterize the boundaries of Case
AA’s impairment for action knowledge, specifically at the semantic
level.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY II: ACTION PRODUCTION AND ACTION
RECOGNITION
Action recognition: action decision
Two videos of an individual (FG) performing actions were pre-
sented for Case AA on every trial, and he had to decide which
was meaningful/real. Real actions (e.g., intransitive: saluting)
were gestures that conveyed meaning, while “unreal” actions
were gestures that did not convey meaning but made sim-
ilar use of the limbs. Case AA was at ceiling when mak-
ing action reality decisions over meaningful intransitive action
clips (10/10).
Pantomime discrimination
Eighteen videos of transitive actions were centrally presented with
two words denoting objects to the left and to the right below the
video. On every trial Case AA was asked to decide which object
was used in the action being pantomimed in the video. Case AA
was not significantly impaired relative to controls for discriminat-
ing pantomimes (14/18, 78%, p= 0.22). See Table 1 for all Action
Recognition results; see also Figure 2.
Table 1 | Action recognition.
Action
Recognition
Control sample Case AA’s score Significance test
n Mean SD t p
Action
decision
– – – 1 – –
Pantomime
discrimination
6 0.9 0.08 0.78 −1.39 0.22
Control participants (n), mean control proportion correct (Mean), control standard
deviation (SD), Case AA’s proportion correct (Case AA’s scores) and t- and p-scores
characterizing the difference between Case AA and control participants.
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FIGURE 2 |The dissociation between Case AA’s ability to produce meaningful actions and Case AA’s ability to recognize meaningful action.
Action production: overview of methods and tasks
Over multiple sessions Case AA was asked to imitate transitive
and intransitive pantomimes, to pantomime transitive and intran-
sitive actions from verbal command, and tactilely identify and
use objects in hand. Because Case AA had a right hemiplegia,
he was confined to using his non-dominant left hand for all
action production tasks; thus, all control participants used their
non-dominant left hand when performing actions. Fifteen objects
(hammer, screwdriver, scissors, hairbrush, spray bottle, spoon,
cup, pliers, wrench, stapler, hole puncher, nail clipper, paint roller,
feather duster, clothespin) were used across multiple tests probing
action and object knowledge; 10 gestures that did not necessitate
the use of objects were also used (i.e., intransitive actions: peace
sign, thumbs up, hitchhiking, waving goodbye, beckoning “come
here,” making a fist, military salute, gesturing crazy, signaling
someone to stop, signaling to be quiet). For all action production
tasks (pantomime from verbal command, imitation), pantomimes
were blocked by type (e.g., transitive/intransitive) and Case AA was
asked to perform each pantomime immediately after the experi-
menter had completed the action; if Case AA was not able to
respond within 10 s the trial was scored as a zero. However, if Case
AA responded within 10 s, he was given ample time to produce
the action. For the pantomime imitation tasks, the experimenter
(FG) performed a transitive or intransitive gesture on each trial
and Case AA was asked to imitate the gesture immediately after
the experimenter had completed the action. If Case AA did not
imitate within 10 s after the experimenter finished the action the
trial was scored as a zero.
All actions, for both Case AA and controls, were scored using
the criteria established by Power et al. (2010). The Florida Apraxia
Battery-Extended and Revised Sydney (FABERS) is set of scoring
criteria for apraxia that accounts for the diverse types of apraxic
errors. The scoring criteria are organized by content errors (e.g.,
perseverations, semantically related responses), spatial errors (e.g.,
misconfigurations of fingers/limb, body part as tool), temporal
errors (e.g., incorrect sequencing of actions), and “other” errors
(e.g., incorrect pantomime not used in test, failure to produce any
response). This scoring approach thus registers the specific error
patterns of patients while accounting for healthy performance for
other aspects of the action.
Case AA and control participants’ actions were video recorded
and scored offline by the experimenter (FG) and an individual
naïve to the goal of the current investigation. For each trial, the
video was scored for each dimension as specified in the FABERS
protocol. For instance, there are several types of content errors
that apraxics may commit (e.g., semantically related errors such
as pantomiming the use of a hammer when asked to pantomime
using a butcher knife), or several types of spatial errors apraxics
commit (e.g., using their hands/fingers to pantomime object use
(body-part-as-tool – BPAT – errors) or internal/external configu-
ration errors that index abnormal hand/arm posture with respect
to how the object should be appropriately manipulated). For a
description of the error types see Appendix F from Power et al.,
2010; for precedent see Rothi et al. (1988, 1997).
The experimenter (FG) and a naïve individual coded every
action along the 15 dimensions (i.e., Case AA and controls were
given a “1” if the action was in accordance with each individual
dimension, or “0” if the action was incorrect along the various
dimensions). If Case AA and controls accurately produced an
action, they received a score of 15 for that action. In the situation
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where Case AA sporadically would forget how to pantomime an
object’s use (which is scored in the‘other’error type),his action was
not coded“0”for content, spatial, and temporal errors (i.e., actions
were only coded as errors that Case AA and controls committed).
In this way, failure to produce an action effectively removed that
item from the analysis of the error types, in order to have a “clean”
measure of his error breakdown by type. When calculating Case
AA’s performance along content, spatial, temporal, and “other,”
the final score was derived by averaging within error type, across
objects, which resulted in a vector of 15 values (one for every error
type) for each coder; coder values were then averaged. In order
to measure Case AA’s object use, values within object, collapsing
across error type, were averaged for each coder; this resulted in a
vector of 15 values (one for every object) for each coder; coder
object values were then averaged for each object, and the average
of all object values were then averaged together to derive the object
use metric. This scoring protocol was carried out for Case AA and
control participants.
Pantomime from verbal command: transitive actions
A composite score for overall object use can be derived by averag-
ing across all error types for each action; Case AA was impaired
with respect to control participants (13.1/15, 87%, p< 0.001; see
Table 2.). The analysis by error type revealed that Case AA was nor-
mal with respect to content-related properties when pantomiming
transitive actions (14.9/15, 99%, p= 1), but was impaired for spa-
tial properties of the same actions (11.4/15, 76%, p< 0.001). The
temporal aspects of Case AA’s transitive pantomimes were also
(albeit more mildly), affected (14.3/15, 95%, p< 0.05). The final
error category within the FABERS scoring system is somewhat
of a catch-all (e.g., unrecognizable action production); Case AA
was impaired along this dimension as well (14/15, 93%; p< 0.01),
Table 2 | Action production.
Control Sample Case AA’s score Significance test
n Mean SD t p
PANTOMIME FROM VERBAL COMMAND:TRANSITIVE
Content 6 0.99 0.01 0.99 0 1.00
Spatial 6 0.98 0.02 0.76 −10.18 <0.001
Temporal 6 0.99 0.01 0.95 −2.77 0.04
Other 6 0.99 0.01 0.93 −5.56 0.003
Object use 6 0.98 0.01 0.87 −10.18 <0.001
PANTOMIME FROM COMMAND: INTRANSITIVE
Content 6 1 – 1 – –
Spatial 6 1 – 1 – –
Temporal 6 1 – 0.98 – –
Other 6 1 – 0.98 – –
PANTOMIME IMITATION:TRANSITIVE
Content 6 1 – 0.99 – –
Spatial 6 0.98 0.02 0.77 −9.72 <0.001
Temporal 6 0.99 0.01 0.95 −3.70 0.01
Other 6 1 – 1 – –
Object use 6 0.98 0.01 0.91 −6.48 <0.001
PANTOMIME IMITATION: INTRANSITIVE
Content 6 1 – 1 – –
Spatial 6 1 – 0.99 – –
Temporal 6 1 – 0.98 – –
Other 6 1 – 1 – –
TACTILE RECOGNITION, OBJECT USE, AND KNOWLEDGE OF OBJECT FUNCTION
Content 6 1 _ 0.99 – –
Spatial 6 0.99 0.01 0.91 −7.41 <0.001
Temporal 6 1 – 0.96 – –
Other 6 1 – 0.98 – –
Object use 6 0.99 0.01 0.94 −4.63 0.006
Object identification 6 0.97 0.02 0.83 −6.48 0.001
Identifies function 6 0.98 0.02 0.47 −23.61 <0.001
Control participants (n), mean control proportion correct (Mean), control standard deviation (SD), Case AA’s proportion correct (Case AA’s scores) and t- and p-scores
when Case AA was asked to produce action from verbal command, imitate action, and use objects.
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principally reflecting his sporadic failure to pantomime object use
(see Figure 2).
Pantomime from verbal command: intransitive actions
In contrast to his performance with transitive actions, Case AA
was at ceiling for pantomiming the content and spatial properties
of intransitive actions (15/15, 100%, for each). He committed one
temporal (14.7/15, 98%) and one “other” error (14.7/15, 98%),
respectively.
Imitation: transitive actions
Collapsing over all error types, Case AA was impaired relative
to controls (13.7/15, 91%; p< 0.001; for all results see Table 2).
The analysis by error type indicated that Case AA was similar
to controls for content-related properties of the gestures he imi-
tated (14.9/15, 99%). Spatial properties for imitated transitive
pantomimes were impaired (11.6/15, 77%, p< 0.001), as well as
temporal aspects of transitive imitations (14.3/15, 95%, p< 0.05).
Case AA was at ceiling for other properties of the actions he
imitated (15/15, 100%).
Imitation: intransitive actions
Case AA was at ceiling or similar to controls when imitating intran-
sitive pantomimes. The spatial and temporal aspects of Case AA’s
pantomime imitations were between 98–99% (14.8/15–14.9/15),
and the content of his imitation was at ceiling (15/15; for all results
see Table 2).
Tactile recognition, object use, and knowledge of object function
While keeping his eyes closed,Case AA was asked to identify objects
from tactile exploration. An object was placed in front of him on
a soft (i.e., noiseless) surface and he used his left hand to feel the
object. If Case AA was able to identify the object he was asked
to open his eyes. If Case AA was not able to identify the object
with his eyes closed he was allowed to open his eyes in order to
identify the object (however, the trial was scored as a 0 if Case
AA was not able to identify the object with his eyes closed). Case
AA was then asked to describe the function of the object in his
hand, and to show how to use the object. Case AA’s ability to name
objects from tactile feedback was worse than control participants
(12.5/15, 83%, p< 0.01). Case AA’s ability to explain the function
of tools was severely impaired with respect to control performance
(7.1/15, 47%, p< 0.001).
The content of Case AA’s demonstrations of object use was
similar to control participants (14.9/15, 99%), and Case AA was
also similar to controls with respect to “other” properties of object
use (14.8/15, 98%). However, as was the case for the pantomiming
tests (see above), Case AA exhibited an impairment for the spatial
(13.7/15, 91%, p< 0.001), and a mild impairment with the tem-
poral, aspects of the produced actions (14.4/15, 96%; for all results
see Table 2).
DISCUSSION
When Case AA was asked to judge if an observed action was
familiar he was at ceiling; furthermore, when asked to match
object names with a visually presented transitive pantomime he
was not different than control participants. In contrast to his
normal performance for action recognition, Case AA presented
with impairments for action production: spatial properties of the
transitive gestures Case AA imitated or produced from verbal com-
mand were impaired relative to control participants. In addition,
when pantomiming from verbal command, Case AA committed
“other” errors, as he would sporadically forget how to pantomime
an object’s use. The temporal aspects of Case AA’s imitations and
pantomimes from verbal command were also impaired, albeit less
severely, as his accuracy was always in the mid-nineties, and sta-
tistically different due to small standard deviations among control
participants3.
Note the dissociation in performance between transitive and
intransitive gestures: Case AA was a ceiling or within control
range when imitating and pantomiming from command intransi-
tive gestures. This finding rules out limb weakness, confusion, or
an inability to carry out the task as the cause of his difficulties with
transitive actions. On the basis of the dissociation between imitat-
ing transitive and intransitive gestures it has been argued that there
may be separate mechanisms that process transitive and intran-
sitive actions (e.g., see Rumiati and Tessari, 2002; Tessari et al.,
2007). Alternatively, transitive gestures may be harder to produce
rather than processed by discrete cognitive mechanisms (Carmo
and Rumiati, 2009; Mozaz et al., 2009). However, the results from
the control participants do not suggest that task difficulty modu-
lated performance when pantomiming from verbal command or
imitating transitive gestures.
The dichotomy within transitive action production (i.e.,
impaired spatial content, spared conceptual content) was observed
over several testing sessions, spanning 5 months. Thus, the main
theoretical motivation of this investigation was to characterize the
extent to which Case AA’s action knowledge was impaired, and
the degree to which object concepts were commensurately dam-
aged. Embodied cognition theories, as discussed in the Introduc-
tion, predict that conceptual analysis of tools necessarily requires
retrieval of motor information necessary to use tools. Therefore
it follows that the embodied cognition hypothesis would argue
that conceptual knowledge for tools should be proportionately
impaired in this individual.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY III: ACTION-RELATED OBJECT KNOWLEDGE
Matching objects by function
A matching by function task was created using the same 15 objects
in the Action Production tasks. On every trial Case AA was visually
presented with pictures in a triad of three objects and was asked
to decide which object (to the left or right of fixation) shared sim-
ilar functional properties as the (top) target object. For instance,
a triad could consist of scissors, pliers, and knife (where scissors
3We chose to score actions separately for content, spatial, temporal, and “other”
action properties in order to have a sensitive measure to capture dissociations across
different types of errors. It is important to note that this method underestimates the
impairments Case AA had when producing transitive actions (e.g., Case AA scored
a 13.95/15 for “other” errors, but those “other” errors were composed of Case AA
not remembering how to pantomime object use from verbal command). In com-
parison, control participants never forgot how to pantomime object use from verbal
command. This effect cannot be due to an impairment associated with pantomim-
ing from verbal command in general, as Case AA was similar to controls when
pantomiming intransitive actions from verbal command.
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and knife are used to cut; See Buxbaum et al., 2000; Buxbaum
and Saffran, 2002; see also Garcea and Mahon, 2012). Case AA was
within control range when making decisions about object function
(13/15, 87%, p= 0.32). This finding is in contrast to his sponta-
neous production of the function of objects when the objects were
in his hand; however, recognition tasks are generally easier than
production tasks, and so the production task may be a more sensi-
tive measure of AA’s abilities. In addition, Case AA’s knowledge of
object function (using the same objects from the action produc-
tion battery) classically dissociated from his ability to pantomime
object use from verbal command: despite the fact that Case AA
was impaired for spatial properties of the actions he was asked to
pantomime, his knowledge of those objects’ function (as measured
with the matching by function task) remained relatively similar to
controls.
Matching objects by identity
In order to ensure that Case AA had no difficulty visually recog-
nizing the objects he had been asked to use, a matching by identity
task was created. This task was identical in format and materials to
the Matching objects by Function test, except Case AA was asked to
decide which object shared the same identity as the target object
(but using different exemplars of the 15 tools). Case AA was at
ceiling (15/15, 100%, p= 0.80) when asked to match objects based
on identity.
Object sound decision
On every trial Case AA was presented with two nouns and had to
decide which of two objects made the louder sound when used.
Case AA was within control range when judging which object
made the louder sound when used (27/31, 87%, p= 0.85).
Declarative knowledge of tools
Multiple-choice questions about properties of tools were audi-
torily presented to Case AA and control participants (for original
design see Moreaud et al., 1998). The four questions examined goal
of use (e.g., is a hammer used to nail, separate, or cut objects?),
function of use (is a hammer used to do office jobs, cook,or build?),
manner of use (to use a hammer, must you pull, lean, or swing
with it?), and context of use (do teachers, doctors, or carpenters
use a hammer?). Case AA was impaired with respect to control
participants when deciding the precise use of tools (7.1/15, 47%,
p< 0.001), and motor knowledge of tool use (9/15, 60%,p< 0.05).
Case AA was impaired with respect to control performance for
function of use questions (11/15, 73%, control range, 15/15), and
context of use questions (13.1/15, 87%, p< 0.05). Interestingly,
while always worse than controls, Case AA’s ability to make deci-
sions about contextual information of tools (e.g., is a spoon used
by a chef, a painter, or a doctor) was spared (i.e., strongly dissoci-
ated) relative to his knowledge of precise tool use (e.g., is a hammer
used by swinging, throwing, or dropping).
DISCUSSION
Despite Case AA’s poor performance with action production, his
knowledge of action-related object properties remained relatively
intact (see Table 3). His ability to match objects based on their
functional properties was similar to controls, and he was at ceil-
ing when asked to match those objects with other exemplars of
those same objects. Additionally, Case AA’s knowledge of the rel-
ative loudness of the sound given off by an object when used
was intact. The former finding (spared function knowledge) is an
issue that has previously been discussed in the context of apraxia.
For instance, Buxbaum and Saffran (2002) and Buxbaum et al.
(2000) found that apraxic patients with impairments for naming
tools were also impaired when making decisions about which two
of three objects were manipulated similarly; interestingly, those
authors found that apraxics were relatively spared when mak-
ing similar decisions about which two of three objects shared
functional properties.
Thus, the neuropsychological dissociations between impaired
manipulation knowledge and (relatively) spared function knowl-
edge suggest that these different object properties may be
processed by separable systems (for further discussion, see Garcea
and Mahon, 2012). The data from Case AA lend credence to that
hypothesis: despite Case AA’s impaired action production abil-
ity, his knowledge of object function was similar to controls. In
the next section we investigated the degree to which Case AA’s
knowledge of non-action object properties was spared.
Table 3 | Action-related object knowledge.
Control sample Case AA’s score Significance test
n Mean SD t p
Matching by function 6 0.89 0.07 0.87 −0.27 0.32
Matching by identity 6 0.94 0.05 1 1.11 0.80
Object sound decision 6 0.89 0.09 0.87 −0.21 0.85
DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE OFTOOLS
Precise use 6 0.93 0.06 0.47 −7.10 0.001
Motor knowledge 6 0.93 0.08 0.60 −3.82 0.01
Functional use 6 1 – 0.73 – –
Contextual use 6 0.98 0.03 0.87 −3.40 0.02
Control participants (n), mean control proportion correct (Mean), control standard deviation (SD), Case AA’s proportion correct (Case AA’s scores) and t- and p-scores
when Case AA made decisions about action-related object properties.
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EXPERIMENTAL STUDY IV: FORM-, AND COLOR-RELATED OBJECT
KNOWLEDGE
Object size judgment
Case AA and control participants were asked to decide which of
two visually presented printed words (denoting noun concepts)
were larger. Objects were from living and non-living categories
(e.g., Which is larger, a hammer or a piano?). Case AA was within
control range when making size judgments about object concepts
(41/45, 91%, p= 0.39).
Object color judgment
Thirty black and white line drawings of items with prototypical
colors from the Snodgrass andVanderwart (1980) corpus were pre-
sented with two color choices. Case AA and controls were asked to
decide which color best matched the line drawing; Case AA’s object
color matching was within control range (27/30, 90%, p= 0.27).
Definition naming
A spoken definition was presented for Case AA and controls to
identify; target items came from multiple categories of the Snod-
grass and Vanderwart (1980) picture naming battery (e.g., fruits,
vegetables, animals, body parts, musical instruments, tools, cloth-
ing, and vehicles). Case AA was at ceiling for fruit definitions
(9/9, 100%, p= 0.15), and was within control range for veg-
etable (9/10, 90%, p= 0.45) and vehicle definitions (7/9, 78%,
p= 0.48). Furniture definitions were marginally impaired (6/10,
60%,p= 0.05), and animals (5/9, 56%,p< 0.01), body parts (7/10,
70%, p< 0.01), musical instruments (4/9, 44%, p< 0.01), and
tools (1/6, 17%, p< 0.01) were significantly impaired relative to
control participants.
DISCUSSION
Case AA’s non action-related knowledge of objects was further
assessed with several matching and naming tests. Case AA was
similar to controls when making judgments about object size and
color. However, and potentially directly relevant to the theoretical
focus of the investigation, the patient was impaired for definition
naming of several categories of objects (including tools). How-
ever, given that his impairment was general it is not clear what the
source of Case AA’s impairment was. The majority of Case AA’s
incorrect responses were timeouts (i.e., he did not respond within
10 s or could not come up with a name; see Table 4 for results).
While it has been established that Case AA is impaired when
producing actions associated with objects, his knowledge of
action- and non action-related properties of objects was relatively
spared. We thus took to explicitly measuring Case AA’s action
knowledge with a battery of tests that required Case AA to name
and match actions with their associated names and objects.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY V: NAMING AND MATCHING OBJECTS AND
ACTIONS
Naming objects and actions
Objects: snodgrass and vanderwart picture stimuli. Two-
hundred and sixty black and white line drawings of animals, fruits,
furniture, kitchen items, musical instruments, tools, vegetables,
and vehicles were presented for Case AA to identify (Snodgrass and
Vanderwart, 1980). The stimuli were randomly ordered and Case
AA completed this naming test on three separate testing occasions.
The first two sessions were separated by 1 week; the third session
was administered 4 months after the second session. However, the
three scores were averaged into a composite score that was tested
against control values; this procedure did not change any of the
effects associated with the three individual sessions.
On the Snodgrass and Vanderwart Picture Naming task, Case
AA was within control range for all categories except insects and
fruits (name agreement values from 42 participants were obtained
from Appendix B, Table B1 in Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980
and are summarized in Table 5); Case AA was impaired for nam-
ing fruits (8/11, 73%, p= 0.05) and marginally impaired when
naming insects (3.36/8, 42%, p= 0.06). His errors were marked
by omissions (no response within 10 s) and semantically related
responses (e.g., cricket→ beetle).
Table 4 | Form-,and color-related object knowledge.
Control sample Case AA’s score Significance test
n Mean SD t p
Object size judgment 6 0.93 0.02 0.91 −0.93 0.39
Object color judgment 6 0.94 0.03 0.90 −1.23 0.27
DEFINITION NAMING
Animals 6 0.90 0.05 0.56 −6.30 0.001
Body Parts 6 0.98 0.04 0.70 −6.48 0.001
Fruits 6 0.80 0.11 1 1.68 0.15
Furniture 6 0.93 0.12 0.60 −2.55 0.05
Musical instruments 6 0.85 0.06 0.44 −6.34 0.001
Tools 6 0.92 0.14 0.17 −4.96 0.004
Vegetables 6 0.83 0.08 0.90 0.81 0.45
Vehicles 6 0.83 0.06 0.78 −0.77 0.48
Control participants (n), mean control proportion correct (Mean), control standard deviation (SD), Case AA’s proportion correct (Case AA’s scores) and t- and p-scores
when Case AA made decisions about form-, and color-related object properties.
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Table 5 | Naming and matching objects and actions.
Picture naming Control sample Case AA’s score Significance test
n Mean SD t p
SNODGRASS PICTURE NAMING
Animals 42 0.90 0.10 0.87 −0.30 0.77
Birds 42 0.85 0.10 0.73 −1.19 0.24
Body Parts 42 0.88 0.13 0.95 0.53 0.60
Clothing 42 0.89 0.14 0.85 −0.28 0.78
Fruits 42 0.91 0.09 0.73 −1.98 0.05
Furniture 42 0.82 0.22 0.73 −0.40 0.69
Insects 42 0.75 0.17 0.42 −1.92 0.06
Kitchen 42 0.85 0.18 0.88 0.17 0.87
Music 42 0.85 0.13 0.85 0 1
Other 42 0.87 0.14 0.82 −0.35 0.73
Tools 42 0.92 0.12 0.87 −0.41 0.68
Vegetables 42 0.83 0.15 0.72 −0.73 0.47
Vehicles 42 0.85 0.16 0.83 −0.12 0.90
NAMING OF ACTIONS
Action identification 64 0.85 0.05 0.36 −9.72 <0.001
MATCHING OBJECTS AND ACTIONS
Picture-word matching: objects 6 0.98 0.01 0.94 −3.70 0.01
Picture-word matching: actions 56 0.92 0.05 0.72 −3.77 <0.001
Kissing and dancing 6 0.91 0.06 0.83 −1.23 0.27
Pyramids and palm trees 6 0.89 0.05 0.79 −1.85 0.12
Control participants (n), mean control proportion correct (Mean), control standard deviation (SD), Case AA’s proportion correct (Case AA’s scores) and t- and p-scores
when Case AA named Snodgrass and Vanderwart stimuli, action photographs, matched objects and actions with words, and performed the Kissing and Dancing, and
Pyramids and Palm Trees test. Control values for the Snodgrass and Vanderwart Picture Naming test were obtained from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980); control
values for the Action Identification and Picture-Word Matching: Actions test were obtained from Kemmerer et al., 2012.
It is known that visual and linguistic factors (e.g., visual com-
plexity, lexical frequency, concept familiarity) may affect picture
naming speed and accuracy. We did not seek to statistically con-
trol (e.g., through logistic regression) the influence of visual
and linguistic factors that might co-vary by semantic category,
as the pattern of his category dissociation was not of theoret-
ical importance. In other words, if it is the case that visual
complexity or concept familiarity could explain the difficulty
that Case AA had with fruit and insects, this is not germane
to the theoretical goal of the current study, because Case AA’s
ability to name tools was not impaired with respect to control
participants.
Actions: action identification
One-hundred pictures of actions were presented for Case AA to
identify. On every trial a picture was presented and Case AA was
asked to name the action occurring in the picture with a one-
verb response (e.g., juggling; for original materials see Fiez and
Tranel, 1997; Kemmerer et al., 2001, 2012). The Action Identi-
fication task was administered twice over the span of 2 months,
and controls values (see Table 5) were obtained from Kemmerer
et al. (2012). Once again, we collapsed both sessions into one
score; the pattern of results did not change when considering each
session separately. Case AA was severely impaired when identi-
fying actions (36/100, 36%; p< 0.001); his errors were marked
by omissions and naming the objects in the photographs rather
than the actions (squirting→ spray bottle). Case AA persisted in
naming the objects rather than the actions even after (repeated)
explicit instructions were given to name the action performed in
the photograph.
MATCHING OBJECTS AND ACTIONS
Picture-word matching with objects
Sixty-four black and white line drawings from the Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980) corpus were presented with a word below each
picture; on each trial Case AA was asked to decide if the picture
and word were the same. The foils (i.e., “no” trials) were systemat-
ically related to the pictures: foils could be phonologically related
(e.g., picture: pear, word: pencil), semantically related (e.g., pic-
ture: mouse, word: swan), or not related (e.g., picture: lemon,
word: vase) to the target picture. Case AA was impaired relative to
controls (113/120, 94%, p< 0.05). Of the seven errors he commit-
ted, five were semantically related, one was phonologically related,
and one was unrelated.
Picture-word matching with actions
Sixty-nine verbs were presented in the infinitive form at the top
of the screen (e.g., running) with two pictures depicting actions
below the verb (for control values see Table 5; see also Kemmerer
et al., 2012); Case AA was asked to decide which picture best
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matched the verb. Case AA was impaired when asked to match
verbs and action pictures (50/69, 72%, p< 0.001).
Kissing and dancing test
Three verbs were presented in a triangular format and Case AA was
asked to identify which verb to the left or to the right of fixation
was most associated to the central target (for the original design
and materials see Bak and Hodges, 2003). Case AA’s performance
was not different than control participants (43/52, 83%, p= 0.27).
Pyramids and palm trees
The Pyramids and Palm Trees test (PPT; Howard and Patterson,
1992) was administered to Case AA on two test sessions separated
by 1 week. On the first visit Case AA completed the picture version,
and on the second session Case AA completed the word version.
Case AA was not different than control participants when making
conceptual decisions for pictures (41/52, 79%,p= 0.12). While the
word version of this experiment was not administered to control
participants, Case AA’s accuracy with word stimuli was comparable
to his accuracy with picture stimuli (38/52, 73%, χ2 < 1).
DISCUSSION
When asked to identify black and white line drawings of objects,
Case AA was largely unimpaired: Case AA showed marginal
impairments for insects and fruit. All other categories of objects
were within control range. It is particularly noteworthy that Case
AA was within control range when naming the same tools that he
showed impairments for when producing actions (for all naming
results see Table 5; see also Figure 3). In contrast to his intact object
naming ability, Case AA was impaired for naming actions. Case
AA’s errors consisted of omissions (50%) and naming the objects
in the pictures rather than the actions (39%). One possibility is
that Case AA could have an impairment for verbs compared to
nouns, rather than actions compared to objects (e.g., Caramazza
and Hillis, 1991; Shapiro and Caramazza, 2003). A second (and not
exclusive) possibility’s that Case AA had a semantic impairment
for actions but not objects.
It may be of note that while Case AA was severely impaired over
a majority of the action tasks, he was not different than controls
for the Kissing and Dancing test. While Case AA was impaired
for matching pictures of both objects and actions to words, his
ability to match pictures of objects to their corresponding words
was overall less impaired than his ability to match action pictures
and words (for all results see Table 5; see also Figure 4). In this
context it is important to note that Case AA was equally as accu-
rate when asked to read verbs and nouns (see Linguistic Processing
in the Supplementary Materials). We therefore set out to further
investigate the locus of Case AA’s impaired action knowledge, and
to elucidate further whether this impairment affected Case AA’s
object knowledge.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY VI: ATTRIBUTE KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIONS
Case AA completed the Attribute Knowledge of Actions battery
(Kemmerer et al., 2012) on two separate occasions separated by
4 months. We collapsed session 1 and session 2 when calculating
the modified t -test; this procedure had no effect on the magnitude
of the difference between Case AA and control values. All control
FIGURE 3 | Case AA and controls’ tool and action naming accuracy.
FIGURE 4 | Case AA and controls’ picture-word matching accuracy
with actions and objects.
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values can be found in Table 6 (obtained from Kemmerer et al.,
2012).
Word attribute test for actions
On every trial an attribute question (e.g., which would make the
loudest noise?) and two verbs were presented (for control val-
ues see Table 6). Case AA was asked to decide which of the two
verbs best satisfied the attribute question. Case AA was impaired
relative to controls (42/62, 68%, p< 0.001). Interestingly, recall
that when Case AA made similar decisions over object stimuli
he was not different than control participants (see Object Sound
Decision test).
Picture attribute test for actions
This test was identical to the Word Attribute Test but the stimuli
were action photographs. Case AA was significantly different than
controls (48/72, 67%, p< 0.001).
Word comparison test for actions
On every trial three verbs were presented and Case AA was asked
to decide which two were most similar in meaning. Case AA was
severely impaired and performed at chance levels (20.7/44, 47%,
p< 0.001; chance cutoff: 66%).
Picture comparison test for actions
This was identical to the Word Comparison Test but the stimuli
were action photographs. Case AA was at chance and significantly
different than control participants (8/24, 33%, p< 0.001; chance
cutoff: 71%).
DISCUSSION
Case AA’s performance in the Attribute Knowledge of Actions bat-
tery provides more evidence that his impairment affected semantic
information about actions. For instance, over a number of action
property judgment tasks Case AA was at chance; those effects were
consistent, and remained when Case AA was asked to perform the
same action property judgment tasks 2 months later (see Table 6
for all results; see also Figure 5). Another example is the differ-
ence in performance when making loudness decisions with action
and object stimuli: Case AA was impaired in the Word Attribute
Test for Actions but was similar to controls when making loudness
decisions in the Object Sound Decision test.
Table 6 | Attribute knowledge of actions.
Control sample Case AA’s
score
Significance test
n Mean SD t p
Word attribute 56 0.95 0.04 0.68 −6.69 <0.001
Picture attribute 56 0.92 0.05 0.67 −4.96 <0.001
Word comparison 56 0.89 0.08 0.47 −5.20 <0.001
Picture comparison 56 0.84 0.08 0.33 −6.44 <0.001
Control participants (n), mean control proportion correct (Mean), control stan-
dard deviation (SD), Case AA’s proportion correct (Case AA’s scores) and t- and
p-scores when Case AA made attribute judgments of actions. All control values
were obtained from Kemmerer et al., 2012.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY VII: SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE FROM
NON-LINGUISTIC AUDITORY STIMULI
In order to further investigate Case AA’s action knowledge impair-
ment we developed several auditory sound-word matching exper-
iments. Case AA and controls were presented with sounds of
actions and objects, and were asked to match the sound that was
presented with the appropriate action or object that it represents.
This set of tests also permitted us to investigate the modality-
independence of Case AA’s impairment for actions (i.e., if Case
AA’s impairment was restricted to pictorial and lexical stimuli, or
if Case AA’s impairment involved more generally the extraction of
semantic information from action stimuli).
Limb- and mouth-related sound recognition
On every trial Case AA was presented with an action sound and
two verbs, and was asked to match the sound with the appropriate
action. The sounds were natural kinds (10 animal), limb-related
(9 transitive, e.g., hammering; 10 intransitive, e.g., scratching one’s
neck), and mouth-related (8 transitive, e.g., slurping soup; 10
intransitive, e.g., sneezing; for original experiment see Pazzaglia
et al., 2008). In addition to the animal sounds, two non-biological
noises (e.g., cooling fan buzzing) were included as filler items. The
experiment was carried out twice, and the foils were manipulated
such that there was an “easy” and “hard” version. The hard version
was completed first, and the easy version was administered later
that test session. The“hard”version was normed with age-matched
controls, and was “hard” because the foils were effector-related
to the targets and correct choices. The “easy” version contained
foils that were unrelated to the correct answer. Case AA’s recogni-
tion of limb transitive (e.g., hammering; 9/14, 64%, p< 0.01) and
mouth intransitive (7/10, 70%, p< 0.01) sounds were impaired
in comparison to controls. Interestingly, mouth transitive dis-
criminations were similar to controls (e.g., slurping from a straw;
7/8, 88%, p= 0.12). Case AA’s discrimination of limb intransitive
action sounds (e.g., scratching neck), while not significantly dif-
ferent from control participants, was at chance (5/9, 56%, chance
cutoff: 67%). In contrast to his poor performance with action stim-
uli, Case AA was not different than controls when discriminating
animal sounds (9/10, 90%, p= 0.12).
Animal sound discrimination
On each trial two animal names were presented with an animal
sound (e.g., cow mooing, dog barking) for Case AA to discrimi-
nate. Case AA was asked to match the correct animal name with
the sound that was presented to him. His performance was within
control range (16/20, 80%, p= 0.17).
Environmental sound discrimination
This test was identical in format to the Animal Sound Discrimi-
nation test: Case AA was asked to match the correct object name
with the sound being presented. The sounds were comprised of
human noises (e.g., yawning), tool noises (e.g., chainsaw), and
natural sounds (e.g., ocean, rain); foils were semantically related
to the correct answer choice. Case AA was mildly impaired rela-
tive to controls (12/15, 80%, p= 0.05). While his performance was
mildly impaired, it is important to note that the three errors Case
AA committed were not tool-related.
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FIGURE 5 | Case AA and controls’ accuracy for attribute knowledge of actions.
DISCUSSION
Case AA was consistently at chance or significantly different than
controls when discriminating transitive and intransitive limb-
and mouth-related sounds (see Table 7, and Figure 6). Pazza-
glia et al. (2008) have shown that limb apraxia patients who were
impaired for using objects were similarly impaired when mak-
ing discriminations of limb-related sounds. Those authors also
found that buccofacial apraxia patients who were impaired for
producing gestures with their mouth, were impaired when mak-
ing discriminations over mouth-related sounds. However, when
discriminating animal sounds he was not different than controls,
and when asked to discriminate bodily sounds and natural sounds
his performance was only marginally impaired. These results help
to clarify the boundary of Case AA’s impairment with action
stimuli.
Although Case AA was impaired for limb- and mouth-related
sounds, the pattern of performance is consistent with the results
from other experiments: Case AA’s ability to extract semantic
information from action stimuli is worse than object stimuli. This
finding does not appear to depend on stimulus modality, as the
dissociation between object and action semantics is preserved for
linguistic, pictorial, and sound input.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The theoretical objective of this study was to test the embodied
cognition hypothesis of tool recognition with a detailed analysis
of the dissociation between action and object knowledge in a 47-
year-old individual who suffered a left CVA. Case AA presented
with impairments for object-associated action production, both
when pantomiming from verbal command, imitating action, and
in actual object use. In addition, Case AA’s conceptual knowledge
of action was moderately to severely impaired, and those impair-
ments were stable across several months of testing. In contrast
to his impaired performance with action production and action
knowledge tests, Case AA’s object knowledge was relatively pre-
served: visual object recognition, object naming, and attribute
judgments of several categories of object concepts were within
control range.
As reviewed in the Introduction, a number of fMRI, TMS, and
behavioral studies have been argued to support the embodied cog-
nition hypothesis (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002; Barsalou et al., 2003; Simmons and Barsalou, 2003; Zwaan,
2004; Gallese and Lakoff,2005; Kiefer and Pulvermüller,2012). At a
general level, it is well established that the motor system is activated
during tasks that do not require overt action or even the retrieval
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Table 7 | Semantic knowledge tested from non-linguistic auditory stimuli.
Control sample Case AA’s score Significance test
n Mean SD t p
Animal Sound Discrimination 6 0.92 0.07 0.80 −1.59 0.17
Environmental Sound Discrimination 6 0.94 0.05 0.80 –2.59 0.05
LIMB- AND MOUTH-RELATED SOUND DISCRIMINATION
Hard Version
Limb transitive 6 0.92 0.05 0.64 –5.19 0.004
Limb intransitive 6 0.87 0.16 0.56 –1.79 0.13
Mouth transitive 6 0.98 0.05 0.88 –1.85 0.12
Mouth intransitive 6 0.97 0.05 0.70 –5.00 0.004
Animals 6 0.98 0.04 0.90 –1.85 0.12
Easy version
Limb transitive – – – 0.79 – –
Limb intransitive – – – 0.56 – –
Mouth transitive – – – 0.88 – –
Mouth intransitive – – – 0.90 – –
Animals – – – 1 – –
Control participants (n), mean control proportion correct (Mean), control standard deviation (SD), Case AA’s proportion correct (Case AA’s scores) and t- and p-scores
when Case AA made decisions about animal sounds, human/environmental sounds, and mouth-, limb-, and animal-related sounds.
FIGURE 6 | Case AA and controls’ accuracy when discriminating object and action sounds.
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of action information (e.g., picture naming, word reading), when
the meaning of stimuli implies action. The pattern of dissoci-
ated abilities we have reported in Case AA indicate that action
information is not constitutive of manipulable object concepts.
Here, ‘action information’ refers both to motor-relevant processes
involved in actual object manipulation as well as more abstract
semantic knowledge of actions. Here we step through the theoret-
ical implications of the principal associations and dissociations in
Case AA.
Dissociation I: action production vs. action recognition
When asked to use actual objects, pantomime object use from
verbal command, and imitate transitive gestures, Case AA com-
mitted spatial and temporal errors associated with the action (e.g.,
hand/finger misconfigurations). In contrast, his action recogni-
tion was largely or entirely preserved: He was able to make action
decisions about and discriminate between meaningful gestures.
Case AA was at ceiling or within control range when judging that
intransitive actions were familiar, as well as matching transitive
gestures with the appropriate tool. The observation of impaired
action production in the context of spared action recognition has
been observed in several other cases (Rapcsak et al., 1995; Rumiati
et al., 2001; for the opposite dissociation see Rothi et al., 1986;
Negri et al., 2007). That pattern of dissociation is problematic for
the motor theory of action recognition (Gallese et al., 1996; Fadiga
et al., 2002; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; for critical reviews see
Mahon and Caramazza, 2005; Hickok, 2009, 2010; Stasenko et al.,
in press).
One counterargument against this line of reasoning is that the
foils used in the action recognition tasks with which Case AA was
tested were foils of content. However, the types of errors that the
patient made in action production were not errors of content, but
rather spatio-temporal errors. In this context, it is important to
note that not all of the tests involved foils of content (e.g., the
test requiring recognition of actions as familiar or not). Never-
theless, future work with similar patients should systematically
vary the nature of the foils to match the types of errors that the
patient is making in production (see Rumiati et al., 2001 for such
an approach).
Dissociation II: action vs. object knowledge
The observation that Case AA was unimpaired for naming objects
but impaired for naming actions, and the associated impairments
on tasks requiring non-verbal access to the semantics of actions,
is problematic for the hypothesis that a necessary aspect of the
meaning of manipulable objects involves action representations.
For instance, according to the embodied cognition hypothesis of
tool recognition, naming a visually presented picture of a hammer
requires simulation of the motor processes that would be engaged
in using that object. For instance, Case AA made spatio-temporal
errors in transitive actions, but also had difficulty performing var-
ious matching tasks that did not require overt action production
but instead required retrieval of semantic level information about
actions. Similarly, multiple aspects of object knowledge were tested
(e.g., object decision, picture naming, object color knowledge,
object sound discrimination, matching objects by functional prop-
erties), and were relatively less impaired than action knowledge.
Importantly, while Case AA’s performance was peppered with
impairments at multiple levels of processing for actions, the
various levels of object knowledge remained relatively preserved.
While it is clear that there is a privileged relationship between
action representations and manipulable object identification, the
neuropsychological data we and others have reported undermine
the strong form of the embodied theory of tool recognition (Rothi
et al., 1986; Ochipa et al., 1989; Rapcsak et al., 1995; Rumiati et al.,
2001; Mahon et al., 2007; Negri et al., 2007; Papeo et al., 2010; for
review see Mahon and Caramazza, 2005, 2008). One objection that
may be raised about this conclusion is that a subtle impairment to
object naming may have been missed with the coarse measure of
accuracy. We thus set out to further elucidate Case AA’s ability to
name manipulable objects with the more subtle measure of RT.
Magnie et al. (2003) conducted a norming study where under-
graduate students were asked to rate items from the Snodgrass and
Vanderwart corpus. Participants were asked to rate the ease with
which they could pantomime an item’s use so that others could
recognize the object that corresponds with that action (1= no,
3= unknown, 5= yes). Magnie and colleagues ranked objects as
‘strongly manipulable’ if 80% of subjects rated the objects from 4 to
5; “strongly unmanipulable” objects were items for which 80% of
participants rated from 1 to 2. Thus, it is possible to study the rela-
tionship between the naming performance and the manipulability
of the items. An example of such an analysis is that of Wolk et al.
(2005), who reported a patient with a disproportionate impair-
ment for living things, and relatively less impaired performance
for naming items high along the manipulability dimension. The
authors argued that motor-based representation of objects with
high manipulability indices insulated them from impairment. We
have, in the context of our case, a clear opportunity to explore
this very important prediction from almost the exact opposite
direction: i.e., in a patient with apraxia of object use.
For simplicity, we calculated the average percent correct nam-
ing accuracy, and correct RT latencies for each item, and binned
the data by manipulability index bins: (e.g., 1–2; 2–3; 3–4; 4–4.9)
to derive a single naming accuracy, and a single RT latency for each
discrete manipulability index (see Table 8; see also Appendix B in
Wolk et al. (2005) for manipulability indices). Importantly, these
are the same bins that Wolk and colleagues used. Case AA’s nam-
ing performance was positively correlated with the manipulability
Table 8 | Manipulability index naming analysis.
Case AA’s scores
PC PC SD RT RT SD
Manipulability index 1 0.82 0.03 1741 125
Manipulability index 2 0.84 0.05 1591 237
Manipulability index 3 0.90 0.03 1660 262
Manipulability index 4 0.89 0.04 1526 91
Mean Naming Proportion Correct (PC), Proportion Correct Standard Deviation
(PC SD), Response Time (RT), and Response Time Standard Deviation (RT SD)
of Snodgrass and Vanderwart Objects as a Function of Manipulability Index from
Magnie et al. (2003).
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index, and the RTs were negatively correlated with manipulability
index. That is, Case AA was more accurate and faster when nam-
ing manipulable objects with higher manipulability ratings (see
Figure 7 and Table 8 for values).
While Case AA’s performance was (admittedly) weakly mod-
ulated by manipulability index, it is interesting to note that the
trends in his naming accuracy and RTs mirror that of the patient
reported by Wolk and colleagues. Thus, despite the fact that Case
AA’s ability to produce actions was grossly impaired, his ability
to name objects rated along the manipulability dimension goes
against the prediction of the embodied cognition hypothesis: Case
AA’s ability to name highly manipulable items should be impaired
commensurate with his action production ability. However, we
find the exact opposite pattern.
It should be noted that there is an association between action
knowledge and action production: Case AA’s impairment in
FIGURE 7 | Case AA’s naming accuracy and response time of
Snodgrass and Vanderwart stimuli as a function of Manipulability
Index from Magnie et al. (2003).
producing meaningful actions was correlated with his impair-
ment for action knowledge. This suggests that damaging the
ability to produce (and putatively simulate) meaningful action
would have a deleterious effect on action semantics, which may
rely, in part, on simulation; however, it is not clear that any-
one would deny that action semantics is intimately related with
motor-relevant information. Whether or not action knowledge
is reducible to motor-relevant information is a separate ques-
tion, and thus the question becomes whether action knowledge
impairments dissociate from apraxia more generally. Critical,
however, for present purposes, is that despite the fact that Case
AA was impaired with action knowledge and action production,
Case AA was able to name tools and match manipulable objects
based on their functional properties (see Figure 8 for principal
findings).
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have argued that the available patient evidence, together with
the new data that we have reported, are difficult to reconcile with
strong forms of the embodied cognition hypothesis of manipu-
lable object recognition. This conclusion raises the issue of what
the implications are then of the range of findings that have been
argued to support that hypothesis? We have argued elsewhere
(Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Garcea and Mahon, 2012) that
inferences about the format of conceptual representations can-
not be drawn without an articulated model of the dynamics
of information exchange among sensory, motor, and conceptual
representations. For instance, if it were the case that activation
spreads between sensory-motor and conceptual levels of process-
ing ahead of selection (i.e., cascading activation) the mere fact that
motor processes are activated or engaged when viewing manipu-
lable objects would have no implications for the format of the
conceptual representation of that object.
While we have emphasized in the current case report a dissocia-
tion between impaired action knowledge and spared object knowl-
edge, it is important to note that performance on action and object
tests are correlated in large group level analyses. For instance,
Buxbaum et al. (2005) (see also Negri et al., 2007) have observed
that production and recognition of actions, or action knowledge
and understanding of object concepts, tend to be correlated in large
groups of patients (see also Pazzaglia et al., 2008). However, there is
FIGURE 8 | Case AA’s principal dissociation between the ability to use and name manipulable objects. * denotes a significant impairment relative to
control participants. The threshold of impairment is plotted two standard deviations below control participants’ mean.
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an asymmetry between associations and dissociations in their rele-
vance to the hypothesis of embodied cognition: there are a number
of possible explanations of associations. For instance, associations
could arise from shared vasculature among the regions support-
ing functionally dissociable processes. One interesting possibility
for future research is whether associations at the group level arise,
in part, from disruptions in network function, caused either by
damage to a hub or to white matter tracts. In contrast, it may
be that selective loss of a knowledge type arises from lesions that
largely spare the critical pathways mediating a broader network’s
function, and/or from lesions that selectively affect a region that
does not have hub-like properties. Patient-based investigations
that combine the techniques and experimental paradigms that
have been developed to study conceptual processing in healthy
individuals have the power to open up new avenues for articulat-
ing a model of information exchange among sensory, motor, and
conceptual processes, and the format of representations at those
levels.
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